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Abstract
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) and Coalition Logic (CL) are well-established logical formalisms
particularly suitable to model games between dynamic coalitions of agents (like e.g. the system and the
environment). Recently, the ATL formalism has been extended in order to take into account boundedness
of the resources needed for a task to be performed. The resulting logic, called Resource-Bounded ATL
(RB-ATL), has been presented in quite a variety of scenarios. Even if the model checking problem for
extensions of ATL dealing with resource bounds is usually undecidable, a model checking procedure for
RB-ATL has been proposed. In this paper, we introduce a new formalism, called PRB-ATL, based on a
diﬀerent notion of resource bounds and we show that its model checking problem remains in EXPTIME
and has a PSPACE lower bound.
Then, we tackle the problem of coalition formation. How and why agents should aggregate is not a new
issue and has been deeply investigated, in past and recent years, in various frameworks, as for example in
algorithmic game theory, argumentation settings, and logic-based knowledge representation. We face this
problem in the setting of priced resource-bounded agents with the goal speciﬁed by an ATL formula. In
particular we solve the problem of determining the minimal cost coalitions of agents acting in accordance
to rules expressed by a priced game arena and satisfying a given formula. We show that such problem is
computationally not harder than verifying the satisfaction of the same formula with ﬁxed coalitions.
Keywords: multi-agent systems, coalition logics, bounded resources, model checking, coalition formations
1 Introduction
Automated veriﬁcation of multi-agent systems is a signiﬁcant topic in the recent
literature in artiﬁcial intelligence [1]. The need of modeling this kind of systems has
inspired logical formalisms, the most famous being the Alternating-time Temporal
Logics [4] and the Coalition Logic (CL) [10,11], oriented towards the description of
collective behaviors.
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The idea of such logics is that agents can join together in teams (or coalitions)
and share resources to accomplish a task (reach a goal). In particular, Alternating-
time Temporal Logics have been introduced in [4], where the full alternating-time
temporal language, denoted by ATL∗, has been presented, along with two signiﬁcant
fragments, namely, ATL and ATL+. These logics are natural speciﬁcation languages
for open system, that is, systems whose behavior depends on the interactions with
an external entity, usually called the environment.
In [9], Goranko has studied the relationship between the (expressive power of
the) two formalisms. In particular, he has shown that CL can be embedded into
ATL. Recently these two logics have been used for the veriﬁcation of multi-agent
systems (MAS), where the agents are equipped with a limited amount of resources
to reach their goal [2,3,6,7] (more on this in the Related works section below).
The framework we present here hinges on these approaches and represents a
further step towards the formalization of such complex systems: multi-agent sys-
tems in which agents can cooperate to perform a task and are subject to a limited
availability of resources, that is an intrinsic feature of most real-world systems. In
particular formulae of the formalisms proposed in [2,3,6,7] allow one to assign an
endowment of resources to the agents by means of the so-called team operators
(borrowed from ATL). The problem is then to determine whether the agents in the
proponent team have a strategy to carry out the assigned goals with that bounded
amount of resources, whatever the agents in the opponent team do. Anyway, the
treatment of this boundedness presents some weakness, as we will point out below.
Based on the natural observation that, in order to acquire a resource, there is a
price to be paid, usually depending also on the availability of the resource on the
market, we propose to consider bounded resources that have each a price to be paid
by the agents for their use in reaching the goal. Thus diﬀerently from the existing
approaches, agents are equipped with an amount of money instead of an endowment
of resources. Money is in a sense a meta-resource. On one hand, its introduction
is essential to model the natural scenario in which acquiring the resources needed
to perform the task, has a price that depends on several factors: on their global
availability, on the acting agent, and on the current system state. On the other
hand, money has the peculiarity of “measuring” the value of all the resources,
thus, it makes sense to consider problems of optimization (e.g., minimization of the
amount of money needed to acquire the resources to perform a task).
In the previous approaches the notion of boundedness of resources is somehow
weak, in the sense that resource bounds only appear in the formulae and are applied
solely to the proponent team, but they are not represented inside the model at all.
This means that it is possible to ask whether a team can reach a goal with a given
amount of resources, but it is not possible to keep trace of the evolution of the
availability of resources in the world (in particular, the resource consumption due
to the actions of the opponent is not controlled). For example, consider the formula
〈〈Ab〉〉p, belonging to the formalism proposed in [3]. Its intuitive semantics is that
the team A can guarantee that p always holds, independently from the behavior of
the opponent (AG \ A), using an amount of resources bounded by b. A model for
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this formula must contain a loop where the joint actions of agents in the team A do
not consume resources, but the joint actions of agents in the opponent team may
possibly consume resources, leading to an unlimited consumption of resources. In
our opinion, such a behavior is not realistic.
We introduce hence a notion of global availability of resources on the market (or
in nature) that evolves depending on both proponent and opponent behaviors. Such
resources are shared, in the sense that all the agents draw on resources from a shared
pool and acquisition of a resource by an agent (independently if the agent belong
to the proponent or opponent team) implies that the resources will be available in
smaller quantity.
The notion of money used here presents several similarity with the notion of
resources used in [3]. Indeed, here money is given to the agents to perform a task
(like resources are given to the agents in [3]). Moreover, the consumption of money
of the opponent is not controlled (like resource consumption of the opponent in [3]).
Money, unlike the other resources, can thus be thought of as a private (non-shared)
resource. Additionally, opponent has unlimited economic power, in the sense that
opponent’s agents are supposed to have enough money to acquire all resources they
need (this reﬂects the choice to not limit the opponent power, as it is usual in
game theory, to look for robust strategies of the proponent). Roughly speaking, the
opponent can buy everything, except for resources that do not exist anymore.
Another aspect that has not been fully analyzed in the literature is the problem
of actions producing resources. On the one hand, in [2,3], actions can only consume
resources; on the other hand, in [7], the authors state that whenever actions can pro-
duce resources the model checking problem is undecidable. It can be easily argued
that the undecidability comes from the unboundedness production of resources,
thus we naturally constrain the way in which actions can produce resources: it is
possible for an action to produce a resource in a quantity that is not greater than
the amount that has already been consumed so far. Such a notion makes sense as,
in practical terms, it allows one to model signiﬁcant real-world scenarios, such as,
acquiring memory by a program, leasing a car during a travel, and, in general, any
scenario in which an agent is releasing resources previously acquired.
Finally, we also tackle the problem of coalition formation. How and why agents
should aggregate is not a new issue and has been deeply investigated, in past and
recent years, in various frameworks, as for example in algorithmic game theory,
argumentation settings, and logic-based knowledge representation (see [8,5]). We
face this problem in the setting of priced resource-bounded agents with the goal
speciﬁed by an ATL formula. In particular we solve the problem of determining
the minimal cost coalitions of agents acting in accordance to rules expressed by a
priced game arena and satisfying a given formula.
We show that both the model checking problem and the optimal coalition prob-
lem are in EXPTIME and have a PSPACE lower bound.
Related works. In [2], Alechina et al. introduce the logic RBCL, whose language
extends the one of CL with explicit representation of resource bounds. In [3], the
same authors propose an analogous extension for ATL, called RB-ATL, and give a
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model checking procedure that runs in time O(|ϕ|2·r+1×S), where ϕ is the formula
to be checked, S is the model, and r is the number of resources. Thus, if the number
of resources is treated as constant, the model checking problem for RB-ATL is in
PTIME. However, the problem of determining a lower bound to the model checking
problem and, in particular, whether a PTIME algorithm exists even if the number
of resources is not treated as a constant factor is left open.
In [7], Bulling and Farwer introduce the logics RAL and RAL∗. The former
represents a generalization of Alechina et al.’s RB-ATL, the latter is ATL∗ extended
with bounded resources. The authors study several syntactic and semantic variants
of RAL and RAL∗ with respect to the (un)decidability of the model checking problem.
In particular, while previous approaches only conceive actions consuming resources,
they introduce the notion of actions producing resources. It turned out that such a
new notion makes the model checking problem undecidable.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we formalize our logic
to consider priced resources, then in section 3 we analyze the complexity of the
model checking problem and in section 4 we deal with the problem of ﬁnding op-
timal coalitions. Last, we conclude with some considerations on future research
directions.
2 A logical formalization: PRB-ATL
In this section we deﬁne the logic Priced RB-ATL (PRB-ATL). We start with the
introduction of some notations we will use in the rest of the paper. The set of
agents is AG = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a team is any subset of AG. The set of resources
types, called also simply resources, is R = {R1, R2, . . . , Rr}, where R1 represents the
resource ‘time’. The numbers n and r will be used through the paper to denote the
number of agents and resources, respectively. Let M = (N∪{∞})r denote the set of
global availabilities of resources on the market (or in nature) and N = (N ∪ {∞})n
denote the set of money availabilities for the agents, where N is the set of non-
negative integers. Given a money availability $ ∈ N , by $[a] we denote the money
availability for the agent a, for each a ∈ AG. Finally, the set Π is a ﬁnite set of
atomic propositions.
The formulae of PRB-ATL are given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A$〉〉 © ϕ | 〈〈A$〉〉ϕUϕ | 〈〈A$〉〉ϕ | ∼ b
where p ∈ Π, A ⊆ AG, ∼∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >}, b ∈ M and $ ∈ N . Intuitively, formulae
of the kind ∼ b test the current availability of resources on the market.
Formulae of the kind 〈〈A$〉〉ψ, with ψ ∈ {©ϕ, ϕUϕ,ϕ}, state that the team A
has a strategy such that, for every action performed by the opponent (i.e, AG \A),
ψ is satisﬁed, and such that the total expenses of each agent a ∈ A is less than or
equal to $[a]. Without loss of generality, we can assume $[a] = ∞ for each a /∈ A.
Formulae of this logic are evaluated with respect to (a location of) a priced game
structure and an initial availability of resources. Intuitively, a priced game structure
G is a graph whose vertices, called locations, are labeled by atomic propositions.
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In each location, each agent can choose among a non-empty set of actions to be
performed. Any possible combination of actions gives rise to transitions, that are
the edges of the graph. In general, actions consume and produce resources. Each
resource has a price that is variable and depends on, inter alia, the current avail-
ability of that resource on the market. Thus, a transition can be executed if the
resources needed to perform the actions are available and the agents of a team have
enough money to acquire them.
We extend the sum operation to sum between vectors component-wise. Addi-
tionally, we use the usual component-wise comparison relations between vectors and
denote by 0k the vector of k 0s. When the size of the vector is clear, we will simply
write 0. Finally, the behavior of ∞ with respect to the sum operation is deﬁned as
usual, that is, ∞+ c = c+∞ = ∞+∞ = ∞, for each constant c.
Formally, priced game structures are deﬁned extending the deﬁnitions of con-
current game structure and resource-bounded concurrent game structure given in,
respectively, [4] and [3].
Deﬁnition 2.1 [priced game structure] A priced game structure G is deﬁned as a
tuple 〈Q, π, d, qty, δ, ρ,m0〉, where:
• Q is the ﬁnite set of locations.
• π : Q → 2Π is the valuation function.
• d : Q×AG → N is the action function, that deﬁnes the actions which are available
to each agent a ∈ AG at each location q ∈ Q. We assume that each agent has at
least one available action at each location, that could be thought of as the action
do-nothing and without loss of generality we assume it is always the ﬁrst, denoted
thus by the natural number 1. As a consequence, we have that d(q, a) ≥ 1, for
each a ∈ AG, q ∈ Q. Given a team A, an action proﬁle αA is a vector assigning
an action to each agent a ∈ A. Action proﬁles represent joint actions of a team.
For each location q ∈ Q and team A = {a1, . . . , ak} ⊆ AG, we denote by DA(q)
the set of action proﬁles available to the team A at the location q, deﬁned as
DA(q) = {1, . . . , d(q, a1)}× . . .×{1, . . . , d(q, ak)}. For the sake of readability, we
denote DAG(q) by D(q). Given a team A, an agent a ∈ A, and an action proﬁle
αA, we will refer to the component of the vector αA corresponding to the agent a
as αA(a). Actions (resp., action proﬁles) are usually denoted by α, α1, . . . (resp.,
α,α1, . . .).
• qty : Q×AG×N → Zr is a partial function, deﬁned over the triples (q, a, i) with i ∈
d(q, a), deﬁning the amount of resources required by an available action to a given
agent at a given location. A negative cost represents a resource consumption,
while a positive one represents a resource production. Moreover, we have that
qty(q, a, 1) = 0r, that is the vector whose components are all equal to 0, for every
q ∈ Q, a ∈ AG (doing nothing neither consumes nor produces resources). With
an abuse of notation we also denote by qty the function deﬁning the amount
of resources required by an action proﬁle αA ∈ DA(q), that is qty(q,αA) =∑
a∈A qty(q, a,αA(a)). Finally, we deﬁne the function consd : Q×AG ×N → Nr
in such a way that consd(q, a, α) returns the vector of the resources which are
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consumed by an agent a for an action α. This vector is obtained from qty(q, a, α)
by replacing the positive components, representing a resource production, with
zeros, and the negative components, representing a resource consumption, with
their absolute values.
• δ : Q×Nn → Q is the transition function, that deﬁnes the next location reached
from q if the agents perform the action proﬁle α ∈ Nn. It is a partial function
deﬁned over the set of pairs (q,α) ∈ Q× Nn such that α ∈ D(q).
• ρ : M×Q×AG → Nr is the price function, denoting the price of each resource,
depending on the current resource availability, the acting agent, and the current
location. Without loss of generality, we can assume the price of the resource
‘time’ to be always zero, as it is a resource that cannot be acquired and thus its
price is meaningless.
• m0 is the initial global availability of resources. It represents the resource avail-
ability on the market at the initial state of the system.
In order to give the formal semantics we must deﬁne the following notions.
Deﬁnition 2.2 [conﬁguration and computation] A conﬁguration c of a priced game
graph G is a pair 〈q,m〉 ∈ Q ×M. A computation over G is an inﬁnite sequence
of conﬁgurations of G λ = c1c2 . . ., such that, for each i, if ci = 〈qi,mi〉 and ci+1 =
〈qi+1,mi+1〉, then there exists a transition δ(qi,α) = qi+1, with α = 〈α1, . . . , αn〉,
such that mi+1 = mi + qty(qi, α).
Let λ = c1c2 . . . be a computation. We denote by λ[i] the i-th conﬁguration ci
in λ and by λ[i, j], with i ≤ j, the ﬁnite sequence of conﬁgurations cici+1 . . . cj in λ.
Deﬁnition 2.3 [strategy] A strategy FA for the team of agents A is a function
which associates, to each ﬁnite sequence of conﬁgurations c1c2 . . . cs, with s ≥ 1,
and cs = 〈qs,ms〉, an action proﬁle αA ∈ DA(qs).
In other words, a strategy FA determines the behavior, that is action proﬁle αA,
of the agents in the team A. Anyway, for each action proﬁle αA and conﬁguration
c ∈ Q×M, depending on the diﬀerent action proﬁles of the opponent team AG \A,
there are several possibilities for the next conﬁguration, called outcomes of αA at
the conﬁguration c.
In determining such outcomes, we do not consider unfeasible action proﬁles of
the proponent (resp., opponent) team, that is, action proﬁles which consume an
amount of resources greater than the current availability m or produce an amount
of resources greater than m0−m. (Notice that an action proﬁles can be unfeasible
even if each action of a single agent is feasible) This reﬂects the natural concept that
the proponent team cannot conceive a strategy based on unfeasible action proﬁles.
Analogously, the opponent team cannot prevent the achievement of a goal by the
proponent through an unfeasible action proﬁle.
Formally, given a conﬁguration c = 〈q,m〉, the set out(c,αA) of the outcomes
of αA at the conﬁguration c, contains 〈q′,m′〉 if there exists αAG extending αA
such that
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• q′ = δ(q,αAG),
• m′ = m+ qty(q,αAG),
• 0 ≤ qty(q,αA) +m ≤ m0.
• 0 ≤ qty(q,αAG\A) + m ≤ m0, where αAG\A is the restriction of αAG to the
team AG \A.
As a consequence of the above deﬁnition, given a conﬁguration c, a strategy FA
gives rise to a tree of computations. A computation λ = c1c2 . . . is called an outcome
of the strategy FA from the conﬁguration c, if c1 = c and ci+1 ∈ out(ci, FA(λ[1, i])),
for each i ≥ 1. The set of such computations is denoted by out(c, FA).
Finally, we introduce the concept of consistent strategy, whose outcomes are
such that in every conﬁguration the agents have enough money to realize it.
Deﬁnition 2.4 [($,m0)-strategy] Let $ ∈ N and m0 ∈ M. A strategy FA is
said to be a ($,m0)-strategy if for each λ = c1c2 . . ., with ci = 〈qi,mi〉 for all i,
belonging to out(c1, FA), the following conditions hold, for every i ≥ 1 and a ∈ A:
• 0r ≤ mi ≤ m0,
• ∑i
j=1 ρ(mj , qj , a) · consd(qj , a, FA(q1 . . . qj)(a)) ≤ $[a].
The two above conditions state the consistency of a computation with respect
to the m and $, where the dot operator denotes the usual scalar product of vectors.
Observe that, in the second condition, only the money availability of the team A is
tested. Actually, we suppose that the opponent team AG \ A always have money
enough to make its choice. Notice also that, as another consequence of the second
condition, the actions producing resources do not cause a reimbursement of money
to the agents.
Observe that, as it is usual when dealing with temporal logics, we guarantee
that priced game structures are non-blocking, in the sense that a ﬁnite preﬁx of a
computation satisfying the two conditions can always be followed by a next conﬁg-
uration without violating the consistency. Actually, a team A can always choose all
the do-nothing actions of its agents, and the opponent team have choices which do
not require an amount of resources greater than the resource availability.
We now can give the semantics of PRB-ATL formulae. The truth of a formula
of PRB-ATL is deﬁned with respect to a priced game structure G and a conﬁgura-
tion c = 〈q,m〉. The deﬁnition of the semantics of PRB-ATL is completed by the
deﬁnition of the satisfaction relation |=, as follows:
• (G, c) |= p iﬀ p ∈ π(q)
• (G, c) |= ¬ψ iﬀ (G, c) |= ψ
• (G, c) |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iﬀ (G, c) |= ψ1 and (G, c) |= ψ2
• (G, c) |= 〈〈A$〉〉 © ψ iﬀ there exists a ($,m0)-strategy FA such that, for all
λ ∈ out(c, FA), it holds that (G, λ[1]) |= ψ
• (G, c) |= 〈〈A$〉〉ψ1Uψ2 iﬀ there exists a ($,m0)-strategy FA such that, for all
λ ∈ out(c, FA), there exists i ≥ 0 such that (G, λ[i]) |= ψ2 and, for all 0 ≤ j < i,
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it holds that (G, λ[j]) |= ψ1
• (G, c) |= 〈〈A$〉〉ψ iﬀ there exists a ($,m0)-strategy FA such that, for all λ ∈
out(c, FA), it holds that (G, λ[i]) |= ψ for all i ≥ 0
• (G, c) |= ∼ b iﬀ m∼ b
3 Model checking
In this section we study the model checking problem for PRB-ATL and we show that
it is in EXPTIME and has a PSPACE lower bound. The model checking problem
consists in verifying whether a formula ϕ is satisﬁed with respect to a conﬁguration
c = 〈q,m〉 of a priced game structure G, (G, c) |= ϕ.
3.1 A model-checking algorithm
The algorithm for model checking our logic is mostly based on the ones proposed in
[4] and [3] for model checking, respectively, ATL and its resource-bounded extension
RB-ATL (see Algorithm 1, where M≤m denotes the set {m′ ∈ M | m′ ≤ m}, for a
resource availability m ∈ M). Roughly speaking, it computes, for each sub-formula
ϕ′ of the formula ϕ to be checked against a model G, the set of conﬁgurations in
which ϕ′ holds. Note that in our setting it is not suﬃcient to compute the set of
states where a sub-formula holds, we need to take into account also the current
resource availability. The main issues when dealing with bounds on resources are
the following. First, the set of sub-formulae must be replaced by an extended set of
formulae, called Sub+, that includes also, for each sub-formula of the form 〈〈A$〉〉ϕ′,
all the formulae 〈〈A$′〉〉ϕ′, with $′ < $. Second, we need to take trace not only
of the states but also of the conﬁgurations since we must take into account the
resource availability on the market to guarantee that during the computation the
needed resources are available, as well as to be able to compute the current prices of
these resources, that depend also on their availability. Finally, it must be ensured
that, even if actions can produce resources, availability of each resource may not be
higher than the initial availability. Let us stress that such a requirement is crucial
to preserve decidability even when actions are allowed to produce resources.
Algorithm 1 heavily relies on the function Pre(A, [ϕ],$, G,m) (see Algorithm
2) which computes the pre-image of a set of conﬁgurations with respect to the
transition relation of G and according to the resource and money availabilities.
More precisely, it returns all the conﬁgurations 〈q′,m′〉 for which there exists an
action proﬁle αA such that for all αAG extending αA, the conﬁguration 〈q′′,m′′〉
satisﬁes ϕ where q′′ = δ(q′,αAG), m′′ = m′ + qty(q′,αAG), and the conditions of
Deﬁnition 2.4 are satisﬁed.
Let M be the maximum component occurring in the initial resource availability
vector m0 and S be the maximum component occurring in the money endowment
vectors $i occurring in ϕ. Thus the proposed algorithm runs in time O(|ϕ| · |G| ·M r ·
Sn). Indeed, the outermost loop (line 1) is executed at most |Sub+(ϕ)| = |ϕ| · Sn
times. The cases in which ϕ′ is of the form 〈〈A$〉〉ψ1Uψ2 or 〈〈A$〉〉ψ require 2 loops.
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Algorithm 1 MC(ϕ,G, q,m) // returns true iff (G, 〈q,m〉) |= ϕ
1: for all ϕ′ ∈ Sub+(ϕ) do
2: if ϕ′ = p then
3: [ϕ′] ← {〈q′,m′〉 | p ∈ π(q′),m′ ≤ m0}
4: else if ϕ′ =∼ b then
5: [ϕ′] ← {〈q′,m′〉 | m′ ∼ b and m′ ≤ m0}
6: else if ϕ′ = ¬ψ then
7: [ϕ′] ← (Q×M≤m0 ) \ [ψ]
8: else if ϕ′ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 then
9: [ϕ′] ← [ψ1] ∩ [ψ2]
10: else if ϕ′ = 〈〈A$〉〉 © ψ then
11: [ϕ′] ← Pre(A, [ψ],$, G,m)
12: else if ϕ′ = 〈〈A0n 〉〉ψ1Uψ2 then
13: τ ← [false], σ ← [ψ2]
14: while τ = σ do
15: τ ← σ
16: σ ← τ ∪ (Pre(A, τ,0n, G,m) ∩ [ψ1])
17: end while
18: [ϕ′] ← σ
19: else if ϕ′ = 〈〈A$〉〉ψ1Uψ2, with $ ≥ 0n, ¬($ = 0n) then
20: τ ← [〈〈A0n 〉〉ψ1Uψ2]
21: for all $′ s.t. $′ ≤ $, ¬($′ = $) do
22: σ ← τ ∪ (Pre(A, [〈〈A$′ 〉〉ψ1Uψ2],$− $′, G,m) ∩ [ψ1])
23: while τ = σ do
24: τ ← σ
25: σ ← τ ∪ (Pre(A, τ,0n, G,m) ∩ [ψ1])
26: end while
27: end for
28: [ϕ′] ← σ
29: else if ϕ′ = 〈〈A0n 〉〉ψ then
30: τ ← [true], σ ← [ψ]
31: while τ = σ do
32: τ ← σ
33: σ ← [ψ] ∩ Pre(A, τ,0n, G,m)
34: end while
35: [ϕ′] ← σ
36: else if ϕ′ = 〈〈A$〉〉ψ, with $ ≥ 0n, ¬($ = 0n) then
37: τ ← [〈〈A0n 〉〉ψ]
38: for all $′ s.t. $′ ≤ $, ¬($′ = $) do
39: σ ← τ ∪ (Pre(A, [〈〈A$′ 〉〉ψ],$− $′, G,m) ∩ [ψ])
40: while τ = σ do
41: τ ← σ
42: σ ← τ ∪ (Pre(A, τ,0n, G,m) ∩ [ψ])
43: end while
44: end for
45: [ϕ′] ← σ
46: end if
47: end for
48: return (〈q,m〉 ∈ [ϕ])
Algorithm 2 Pre(A, [ϕ],$, G,m)
1: res ← ∅
2: for all 〈q′,m′〉 ∈ Q×M≤m0 do
3: for all αA ∈ DA(q′) s.t. 0 ≤ qty(q,αA) +m ≤ m0 do
4: ins ← true
5: for all 〈q′′,m′′〉 where (i) q′′ = δ(q′,αAG) for some αAG ∈ D(q′)
that generalizes αA, (ii) m
′′ = m′ + qty(q,αAG), and
(iii) 0 ≤ qty(q,αAG\A) +m ≤ m0 do
6: if 〈q′′,m′′〉 ∈ [ϕ] or ¬(0r ≤ m′′ ≤ m0)
or ¬($[a] ≥ ρ(m′, q′, a) · consd(q′, a,αAG(a)) for some a ∈ A then
7: ins ← false
8: end if
9: end for
10: if ins then
11: res ← res ∪ {〈q′,m′〉}
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: return res
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The outer one (lines 19 and 36, respectively) is executed at most Sn times, while the
inner one (lines 21 and 38, respectively) is executed at most |Q×M≤m0 | ≤ |Q| ·M r
times. Since |Q| ≤ |G|, we have the above asymptotic complexity. Notice that the
complexity of the function Pre can be ignored as it is absorbed in the complexity
of the main algorithm. To sum up, the algorithm runs in exponential time with
respect to the size of the input.
Theorem 3.1 Model checking PRB-ATL can be solved in exponential time in the
number of agents and resources.
3.2 PSPACE-hardness
Here, we provide a lower bound to the complexity of the model checking problem
for PRB-ATL. To this aim, we will reduce the problem of determining the truth
value of Fully Quantiﬁed Boolean Formulae, TQBF problem [12], to the model
checking problem for PRB-ATL. A fully quantiﬁed Boolean formula is a Boolean
formula in which all the Boolean variables occur inside the scope of an existential
or universal quantiﬁer. A fully quantiﬁed Boolean formula is said to be in prenex
normal form if all the quantiﬁers appear at the beginning of the formula and each
quantiﬁer’s scope is everything following it. Any formula may be easily put into
prenex normal form, thus we consider formulae in this form only. Without loss of
generality, we can also assume that the Boolean quantiﬁer-free part of the formula
is in conjunctive normal form with clauses having at most three literals, where a
literal is either a variable or its negation. For example, ∀x∃y[(x∨y)∧(¬x∨¬y)] and
∃x1∀x2∃x3[(x1 ∨x2 ∨¬x3)∧ (¬x1 ∨¬x2 ∨x3)] are fully quantiﬁed Boolean formulae
in the desired normal form. TQBF is the problem of determining whether a fully
quantiﬁed Boolean formula is true.
Let Φ = Q1x1Q2x2 . . . Qkxk[(x
1
1 ∨ x12 ∨ x13) ∧ . . . ∧ (xh1 ∨ xh2 ∨ xh3)] be a fully
quantiﬁed Boolean formula, where Qi are quantiﬁers, xi are Boolean variables, for
1 ≤ i ≤ k, and xj1, xj2, xj3 are literals, for 1 ≤ j ≤ h. We must exhibit a priced game
structure G, a conﬁguration c of G, and a PRB-ATL formula ϕ such that (G, c) |= ϕ
if and only if Φ is true.
The priced game structure GΦ corresponging to Φ is computed as follows. (As
an example, in Figure the graph of the priced game structure generated from
the formula Φ = ∃x1∀x2∃x3[(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x3)] is shown). The set
of locations is made up of the following locations:
• 3 locations, denoted qi, qi , q
⊥
i for each quantiﬁer Qi,
• the location qk+1,
• a location qci for each clause ci,
• 2 locations, denoted qxi and q¬xi , for each variable xi,
• the locations q.
There exist r = 2 · k resources, two for each Boolean variable, that is, R =
{Rx1 , R⊥x1 , . . . , Rxk , R⊥xk} and only one agent (AG = {1}). Initially, there is only
one item available for each resource, that is, the vector m0 has all components
1
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equal to 1. Notice that, since there is only one agent, there are only 2 possible
teams, namely ∅ and AG. This means that the reduction (and the hardness result)
also applies to the extension of CTL with prices for bounded resources.
The idea of the reduction is that from any location qi there are only two sig-
niﬁcant transitions, leading to qi and q
⊥
i . The intended meaning of the transition
leading to qi (resp., q
⊥
i ), which is called true transition (resp., false transition),
is to assign the truth value true (resp., false) to the Boolean variable xi. We
need a machinery to remember such an assignment. To this aim, we make use of
the resources and their limited availability: the transition leading from qi to q

i
(resp., q⊥i ) is such that exactly 1 item of the resource R

xi (resp., R
⊥
xi) is consumed.
Analogously, there exists a transition starting from the location qxi (resp., q¬xi)
and leading to q. The transition leading from qxi (resp., q¬xi) to q is such that
exactly 1 item of the resource R⊥xi (resp., R

xi) is consumed. In this way, if in the
location qi the true (resp., false) transition has been chosen, when the game is on
the location q¬xi (resp., qxi), the agent is not able to choose the transition leading
to q, indicating that the literal is false. There exists only one atomic proposition,
namely p, that is true only over the location q.
q1
q1 q
⊥
1
q2
q2 q
⊥
2
q3
q3 q
⊥
3
q4
qc1
qc2
qx1
q¬x1
qx2
q¬x2
qx3
q¬x3
q
Fig. 1. The graph of the priced game structure GΦ corresponding to the fully quantiﬁed Boolean formula
Φ = ∃x1∀x2∃x3[(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x3)].
Let Φ be a fully quantiﬁed Boolean formula with k Boolean variables, let m0 be
the vector, of length 2 · k, with all components equal to 1, and let ϕΦ = 〈〈A01〉〉 ©
〈〈AG0〉〉©〈〈A02〉〉©〈〈AG0〉〉©. . . 〈〈A0k〉〉©〈〈AG0〉〉©〈〈AG0〉〉©〈〈∅0〉〉©〈〈AG0〉〉©p,
with Ai = ∅ if Qi is an universal quantiﬁer, Ai = AG, otherwise, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
It is possible to show that (GΦ, 〈q1,m0〉) |= ϕΦ if and only if Φ is true.
Theorem 3.2 The model checking problem for PRB-ATL is PSPACE-hard.
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4 Optimal coalitions
In this section we deﬁne the problem of determining optimal coalitions that are
capable to satisfy a PRB-ATL formula. In doing that, we introduce the notion of
parametric PRB-ATL formula, that is, a PRB-ATL formula in which parametric team
operators 〈〈X$〉〉 may occur in the place of the classical team operators 〈〈A$〉〉. If
〈〈X$〉〉 is a parametric team operator, then X is a team variable.
Given a parametric PRB-ATL formula ϕ with team variables X = 〈X1, . . . , Xk〉,
and a vector A = 〈A1, . . . , Ak〉 of k teams, we denote by ϕ[X/A] the PRB-ATL
formula obtained from ϕ by replacing every occurrence of Xi with Ai, for every
1 ≤ i ≤ k. We denote by Solϕ the set of the vectors A of teams such that (G, c) |=
ϕ[X/A].
Finally, we associate a cost to each PRB-ATL formula by means of the function
f cost, deﬁned as follows. Suppose that a team A is represented by means of the
characteristic vector of the set A, that is, A is a vector of n binary components
such that the i-th component is 1 if and only if the agent i belongs to the team A,
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For every PRB-ATL formula ϕ, containing the team operators
〈〈A$11 〉〉, 〈〈A$22 〉〉, . . . , 〈〈A$kk 〉〉,
f cost(ϕ) =
k∑
i=1
($i ·Ai)
4.1 The problem
In this section, we introduce the problem of ﬁnding an optimal (with respect to the
function f cost) vector of teams that satisﬁes a given parametric PRB-ATL formula.
Given a parametric PRB-ATL formula ϕ, a priced game structure G, a conﬁgu-
ration c of G, the Optimal Coalition problem for PRB-ATL (OC, for short) consists
in ﬁnding a vector A, if any, such that (G, c) |= ϕ[X/A] and that minimizes the
function f cost.
Thus, an algorithm to solve such problem takes the following parameters as
input:
• a PRB-ATL formula ϕ, over team variables X = 〈X1, X2, . . . , Xk〉
• the priced game structure G,
• a conﬁguration c of G,
and outputs the triple 〈res,A∗, cost〉, where:
• res ∈ {true, false} is true if and only if there exists a vector of teams A such
that (G, c) |= ϕ[X/A],
• A∗ is a vector of teams such that f cost(ϕ[X/A∗]) = min
A∈Solϕ
f cost(ϕ[X/A]); its
value is undeﬁned if Solϕ = ∅,
• cost ∈ N is the value of the function f cost applied to ϕ[X/A∗].
Our aim is to show that OC has the same complexity as the model checking
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problem for PRB-ATL.
The upper bound is given by a brute force algorithm that tries to solve the
model checking problem for each possible vector of teams. Since there are (2n)k
diﬀerent vectors of teams, the algorithm will call (2n)k times the algorithm for
model checking PRB-ATL.
For the lower bound, consider the decisional version of the OC problem: given
a parametric PRB-ATL formula ϕ, a priced game structure G, a conﬁguration c of
G, and an integer U , decide if there is a vector A such that (G, c) |= ϕ[X/A] and
f cost applied to ϕ[X/A] does not exceed U . The hardness for such a problem
directly descends from Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 4.1 The decisional OC problem is in between PSPACE and EXPTIME.
5 Discussion
In this paper we have studied the model checking problem for the logic PRB-ATL,
very suitable for modeling scenarios in which teams of agents have to perform a
task and they are subject to boundedness of resources.
Several formalisms have already been proposed to model such a kind of real-
word situations [3,7]. Our main contribution is to present a new formalism, called
PRB-ATL, based on a stronger notion of resource bounds and we show that its model
checking problem We also introduce the problem, called the optimal coalitions (OC)
problem, of ﬁnding optimal coalitions (with respect to the amount of money needed
by the diﬀerent coalitions) capable to perform the task. We have shown that both
the model checking problem for PRB-ATL and the OC problem are in EXPTIME
and have a PSPACE lower bound. As a matter of fact, to solve the OC problem
we give an algorithm that explores the entire space of solutions to compute the
optimum. The problem of ﬁnding the exact characterization of the computational
complexity is an open problem and currently is under investigation.
Further research directions concern the study of variants of the logic, to naturally
express more kinds of scenarios. As an example, it is interesting in our opinion to
consider the money endowment as a component of the game arena (i.e., the model),
instead of explicitly specifying a fresh money availability for each occurrence of
a team operator in the formula. Furthermore, related to this argument, one can
consider the money availability not as an input of the problem, but rather as a
parameter to minimize, to establish how much money each agent should be provided
with, to perform a given task.
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